Iran & Latin America

Brazil, Iran and the Road to the Security Council

Clovis Rossi, Project Syndicate, 4 March 2010

SAO PAULO – The attempt by Brazil’s government to participate in the international negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program could well be called “A Manual for Candidates to a Permanent Membership of the United Nations Security Council.”

Brazil’s diplomatic efforts with Iran – a country suspected of developing nuclear energy for military purposes – began at a meeting last year between President Barack Obama and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva during the G8+5 summit in L’Aquila, Italy.

According to Robert Gibbs, Obama’s press spokesman, and Brazilian authorities, Obama said he had no objections whatsoever to Lula talking to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. But Obama suggested using the weight of commercial relations between the two countries to tell the Iranian leader that he should follow Brazil’s example (in Brazil, the ban on nuclear energy for military purposes is enshrined in the Constitution).

Lula and Ahmadinejad met in June 2009, when Obama was still holding out a hand to the ayatollahs. Lula acted according to Obama’s suggestion when he received Ahmadinejad in Brasilia. He acknowledged – as everyone does – “Iran’s right to pursue a nuclear program with peaceful intentions,” but immediately asked for “respect for the international agreements” and underlined the fact that “this is the road Brazil is following.”

Furthermore, he urged Ahmadinejad “to continue to engage countries interested in finding a fair and balanced solution to Iran’s nuclear question.”

“Engagement” is the key word in this affair. It was used to describe Obama’s new American diplomacy, particularly with regard to Iran, at least until the disputed elections in Iran last summer and the worsening domestic crisis that has ensued.

In Lula’s meeting with Ahmadinejad, the delicate subject of Ahmadinejad’s repeated denials of the Holocaust came up. Lula told his Iranian counterpart that to deny the Holocaust was bad, even for Iran itself. Ahmadinejad replied that he did not deny it, but only criticized what he considered Israel’s “political use” of it. Even so, Lula insisted that he should change his attitude.

“Who else is in a position to say such things to Iran’s president?” asked a top Brazilian diplomat by way of justifying a dialogue that has been sharply criticized by Brazil’s Jewish community, which is emphatically opposed to Lula’s proposed trip to Teheran, scheduled for May.

Relations between Iran and the countries that are negotiating the nuclear question have deteriorated since Ahmadinejad’s visit to Brazil last year, which came soon after his disputed re-election. One result is the open difference of opinion on Iran between French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Lula, or between Lula and German Chancellor Angela Merkel.

During his meeting in Berlin with Merkel last December, Lula insisted on the Brazilian government’s traditional position: sanctions, such as those that the United States strongly advocates, lead to nothing; the best way forward is dialogue. The Brazilian president asked for “more patience” in the talks with Iran.

The German chancellor replied that she was “losing” her patience” with Iranian leaders after “four years of negotiations in which no progress was made.” But Brazil insisted on the path of dialogue and began talking with other stakeholders in the Iranian question, such as Turkey, whose foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, recently staked out a similar position. “We want the Middle East to be prosperous and stable, governed by political dialogue and diplomacy,” Davutoglu said after a visit to Teheran. “Iran’s contribution will be very important in bringing this about.”

But Brazil’s government has also begun to criticize, albeit weakly, Iran’s performance on human rights. At first, Lula minimized the seriousness of the incidents that occurred after Ahmadinejad’s re-election and went so far as to compare them to a dispute between football fanatics. This led to a clash with Sarkozy when Lula visited Paris soon after Iran’s post-election crisis began. While Lula didn’t repeat his comparison with a football game, neither did he criticize the repression, unlike Sarkozy, who did so strongly.

Brazil’s current criticisms of Iran, along with a request for dialogue with the opposition, weak as they may be, represent a change of position, which reflects the absolute priority of Brazilian diplomacy: permanent membership of the Security Council. Brazilian officials know that they can achieve this goal only by acting independently – but without diverging too far from the positions of the current permanent members. They also know that, except for China, all of them are critics of Iran, and are determined to find a solution to the nuclear question, whether through dialogue or some other means, if “patience is lost,” as Merkel suggested.

Credits: Project Syndicate: Brazil, Iran and the road to the Security Council

Clinton's Latin America trip: all about Iran?

Josh Rogin  The Cable/Foreign Policy  1 March 2010

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has added an unplanned stop to her Latin America itinerary: Buenos Aires. The U.S. delegation will stay overnight in Argentina Monday instead of Chile, where the government is still preoccupied with the aftermath of Saturday's devastating earthquake.

"Instead of overnighting in Santiago on Monday night we will travel from Montevideo [Uruguay] Monday afternoon to Buenos Aires in order to meet with Argentine President [Cristina Fernández] de Kirchner, instead of in Uruguay as originally planned," a State Department official on the trip said.

Clinton was in Uruguay this weekend to attend the inauguration of Jose Mujica, a former guerrilla leader turned president. The Kirchner meeting was originally supposed to happen in Montevideo, but was changed after the Chilean earthquake caused Clinton's team to re-examine her travel plans.

Although Latin American countries are no doubt hoping to discuss a range of bilateral issues, Clinton is more likely to focus on the renewed international efforts to pressure Iran regarding its nuclear program. "Iran is at the top of my agenda," Clinton told a Senate committee last week when talking about her trip.

She might find the going tough, particularly in Brazil, which currently holds a seat on the Security Council. Brazil's Foreign Minister Celso Amorim recently poured cold war on the U.S.-led sanctions push, saying, "We don't believe that sanctions will prove effective." Under Secretary Bill Burns, the State Department's lead on the issue, visited the Brazilian capital ahead of the Clinton trip, but it's not clear what he was able to achieve.

Clinton will be in Brasilia Wednesday to meet directly with President Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva and Amorim. Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela previewed Friday what Clinton's message will be when it comes to Iran.

"While we're cognizant of the fact that the Brazilian government has reached out to Iran and has been approaching the Iranians, it's very much on our agenda to try to insist with the Brazilians that in their engagement with Iran, we would like them to encourage the Iranians, of course, to meet their international obligations," he said, adding that the State Department views Brazil's opposition to new sanctions as a "mistake."

Credits: The Cable/Foreign Policy: Clinton's Latin America trip: All about Iran?

Considering means to support the Iranian pro-democracy movement: Technology in Green

Technology in Green

How Removing Sanctions Can Encourage Iranian Democracy

By N. Kashani and M. Sadra, Foreign Affairs, February 26, 2010

Summary: 

The U.S. government is relaxing its limits on the export of Internet technology to Iran. Unless Washington takes further action, though, Tehran's filters might still stop Iranians from accessing critical digital tools.

N. KASHANI and M. SADRA are the pseudonyms of U.S.-based attorneys who are specialists in U.S. export laws regarding Iran.

Last December, the State Department recommended that the U.S. government adjust its sanctions on the export of Internet technology to Iran. This was a major step toward addressing an embarrassing incongruity in U.S. foreign policy. Previously, despite the United States’ espousal of democratic ideals, Congress and multiple administrations had made it illegal for U.S. companies, citizens, or lawful permanent residents to provide Iranian citizens with certain Internet tools, including personal communications programs and anti-filtering software. As the ongoing fallout from Iran’s disputed presidential election last June has shown, such tools are critical in fighting the Iranian regime’s unprecedented campaign of suppressing information and combating political opposition by censoring media, sporadically blocking or slowing the Internet, and intimidating journalists and photographers. The recent shift in U.S. policy, then, is overdue and welcome.

But for this shift to be truly effective, Washington must take further action. This is because, although filter-busting technology exists in Iran, it is hard to come by and often unreliable. Thus some technologies no longer blocked by U.S. sanctions may still remain practically unavailable to Iranians because of Tehran’s filters. Removing sanctions on instant messaging and social-networking software is not enough: to have a concrete effect, the United States must also remove the legal impediments that prevent anti-filtration software from being lawfully exported to Iran.

Iran’s Green Movement, a loosely defined opposition to the ruling establishment, regularly ignores government prohibitions on dissent and uses various outlets to protest governmental corruption, authoritarianism, and opacity. Offline examples include scrawling anti-regime slogans and sarcastic retorts on paper currency and shouting haunting chants of “God is great” from balconies at night. Online, opposition supporters organize rallies through chat rooms and social-networking sites, disseminate videos through YouTube and various other video-sharing sites, and create simple Web sites for posting firsthand accounts of anti-government activism.

Such a reliance on technology should come as no surprise, since Iran has one of the most educated populations in the Middle East. Over 80 percent of Iranians are literate, and more than 25 percent use the Internet (the second-highest percentage in the Middle East, after Israel). And Iranians are proficient adapters of new technologies: Persian (Farsi) is now one of the ten most common languages used worldwide for blogging. This explains why the Iranian government expends great resources on slowing and censoring the Internet -- and why the United States and others should remove sanctions that prevent Iranians from communicating freely, both among themselves and with the outside world.

The State Department’s recent decision means that the Obama administration will now apply broad interpretations to various "exceptions" in the Iranian Transactions Regulations, which date back to 1995.

The State Department’s recent decision means that the Obama administration will now apply broad interpretations to various "exceptions" in the Iranian Transactions Regulations, which date back to 1995 and are promulgated by the Treasury Department. Under this law, the Treasury Department prohibits U.S. persons (defined as companies, citizens, or U.S. residents, regardless of their location) from certain commercial and technological interactions with Iran.

Previously, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the entity charged with administering U.S. sanctions on Iran, interpreted the regulations narrowly. Few goods, services, or technologies qualified as exceptions. For example, OFAC interpreted the regulations’ telecommunications exception to allow only telephone calls -- and not the sale of digital communications -- between Iran and the United States. It was thus a crime for U.S. companies to provide Iranians with Internet services, including many that are standard today, such as Web browsers, instant-messaging programs, and social-networking sites. Likewise, the information exception, which allows export of informational content and materials (such as academic publications and artwork), was also narrowly construed by OFAC. This also prevented instant-messaging programs and social-networking technology from being made lawful for export to Iran.

Developments in technology rendered OFAC’s approach grossly outdated, a fact implicitly acknowledged by the State Department’s recent instructions. But the law will still reflect an antiquated view unless OFAC takes additional measures. First, OFAC must issue a general license allowing companies to provide effective technologies to Iran (or invite parties to apply for specific licenses for that purpose). Unless OFAC issues a general license, individuals and nonprofits will still be required to go through the cumbersome and often arbitrary application process currently in place. Second, OFAC must clarify whether the current information exception -- which clearly excludes information itself, such as publications, films, posters, CDs, and other basic media from U.S. sanctions -- also applies to the complementary software used to access it. OFAC’s longstanding interpretation meant that Internet users were free to send information to Iran, but the software needed to access it was technically prohibited. Thus, software and technology companies such as Microsoft and Google had well-founded fears of U.S. government civil or criminal action against them and consequently blocked Iranian users from using their instant-messaging software. As recently as two weeks ago, the open-source software provider SourceForge blocked its software from Iranian users, citing U.S. sanctions concerns as the reason.

Given the unprecedented and potentially fleeting nature of the Green Movement’s strength, it is imperative that OFAC clarify the new State Department directives. First, the Treasury Department could issue a general license for mass-market communications and anti-filtering software. This would not only allow for the export of existing technologies but also support engineers interested in developing technologies for future distribution and purchase. To maintain safeguards over certain sensitive technologies, OFAC and the Treasury Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security could jointly review each application, as they currently do in other contexts, such as in the approval process for the export of medicines and medical devices.

Second, the U.S. Congress should pass the Iranian Digital Empowerment Act. First introduced in December 2009 in the House, IDEA notes that U.S. sanctions on Iran have had the “unintended effect of stifling Iranians’ access to the Internet and related Internet technologies.” The bill authorizes the export of software and services that would ease communication in Iran and allow Iranians to circumvent online censorship and monitoring efforts. It would help assure those companies and individuals that provide messaging services to Iranians that their actions do not violate U.S. law.

At the same time, IDEA is careful not to directly fund such tools or their dissemination to Iran. This is vital, as any direct involvement would feed the paranoia of Iran’s senior leaders about foreign governments fomenting a “velvet revolution.” Giving any legitimacy to that claim plays into the Iranian regime’s hands by granting them circumstantial evidence of foreign meddling when they have thus far been relegated to making bare allegations.

The world has recognized the courageous struggle of Iranian citizens to have their voices heard. The Iranian government, obsessed with maintaining its power at the expense of its citizens' freedoms, will eventually find itself on the wrong side of history. In the months ahead, the United States has the opportunity to restructure its sanctions policies so as to undermine -- rather than unintentionally support -- the Iranian regime’s bankrupt strategy.

Credits: Foreign Affairs: Technology in Green